Un panel de 186 banques européennes sur la période 1992-2004 est utilisé pour déterminer si les ‡uctua-tions de l'o¤re de crédit des banques sont ampli…ées par la contrainte réglementaire sur les fonds propres et par les règles de provisionnement. Nos résultats sont en accord avec l'hypothèse du canal du capital bancaire : les banques faiblement capitalisées se trouvent contraintes pour accroître leur o¤re de crédit. Nous montrons également que les provisions contractées pour couvrir des pertes identi…ées (provisions non discrétionnaires) ampli…ent les ‡uctuations de l'o¤re de crédits. En e¤et, ces provisions non discrétionnaires évoluent de façon cyclique et conduisent à une mauvaise prise en compte des pertes anticipées. L'incitation de la banque à o¤rir du crédit est donc a¤ectée dans la mesure où les coûts liés à l'accord d'un crédit sont mal évalués. D'autre part, la proportion des provisions utilisée pour des objectifs de management (provisions discrétioanaires) n'a¤ecte pas les ‡uctuations de l'o¤re de crédit. Les résultats de cet article conduisent à recommander la mise en place d'un système de provisionnement dynamique en Europe.
Introduction
Much concern has been recently expressed about factors explaining ‡uctuations in bank lending. Central banks, as well as banking regulators, are concerned since such factors could exacerbate the business cycle, cause …nancial instability and misallocate lending resources. The literature on ‡uctuations in bank lending is based on the work of Bernanke and Blinder (1988) who introduced the credit market equilibrium in a textbook IS-LM model and analyzed the interaction between monetary policy and bank lending. A better understanding of the economy's response to a monetary policy shock requires therefore to consider a bank lending channel (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995) which emphasizes the role of imperfections in the market for bank debt. This hypothesis is empirically supported by Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) for American banks and by Ehrmann et al. (2003) for European banks. Imperfections in the market for bank capital can also be stressed to explain ‡uctuations in bank lending. Van den Heuvel (2002) focuses on capital requirements and de…nes a bank capital channel by which monetary policy can change the supply of bank loans through its impact on bank equity. These two channels do not only operate through changes in monetary policy. They are also relevant in explaining the impact of macroeconomic conditions and changes in banking regulation on bank lending.
In this paper, we point out another factor which may amplify the cyclicality of bank lending: the provisioning system. Provisioning rules and the capital requirement are linked through the coverage of credit risk: the conceptual framework of credit risk management supposes that expected losses have to be covered by loan loss provisions while unexpected losses have to be covered by bank capital. While regulatory constraint explicitly links the expansion of bank lending with bank capital, such a constraint does not exist on provisioning rules. However, loan loss provisions have a direct impact on banks pro…t. An underestimated expected credit risk could reinforce banks'incentives to grant new loans since lending costs are understated.
In addition, increases in loan loss provisions due to deterioration in loan portfolio quality can lead to a decrease in banks capital if losses are too strong. Credit risk management without provisioning rules covering expected credit risk may therefore have procyclical e¤ects. This concern is all the more important as banking regulators and academic researchers focus mainly on capital requirements and tend to disregard provisioning The relationship between loan loss provisions and credit supply ‡uctuations has to be cautiously analyzed because loan loss provisions merge di¤erent information and behaviors. The literature distinguishes two components 1 . The …rst one, called the non discretionary component, is made in order to cover expected credit losses in a bank's loan portfolio (Whalen, 1994; Beaver and Engel, 1996) . This kind of provisioning system is said to be backward-looking since banks mainly relate non discretionary provisions to identi…ed credit losses. During economic upswings, few credit losses are identi…ed and the level of loan loss provisions is low. During downturns, however, loan loss provisions increase because loan defaults are usually high during this period. As a result, the non discretionary component is a driving force in the cyclicality of loan loss provisions and leads to a misevaluation of expected credit losses. The expected credit risk appears as soon as the loan is granted and not only during the downturn when the losses is …nally identi…ed. In particular, Keeton (1999) and Jiménez and Saurina (2005) show that an increase in loan growth during an expansionary phase leads to higher loan losses during the slowdown. Expected credit losses are therefore under-provisioned during an upswing phase. Conversely, banks have to charge provisions too late during the downturn. The cyclicality of loan loss provisions directly a¤ect bank pro…ts and bank capital which could in ‡uence the bank's incentive to grant new loans and increase the cyclicality of its lending.
The second component, called the discretionary component, is due to the utilization of loan loss provisions for management objectives. At least three di¤erent discretionary actions can be distinguished (Liu et al., 1997; Ahmed et al., 1999; Lobo and Yang, 2001 ). The …rst one, the income smoothing behavior, may be countercyclical. Banks have incentives to smooth earnings over time. When earnings are expected to be low, loan loss provisions are deliberately understated to mitigate adverse e¤ects of other factors on earnings.
On the other hand, when earnings are unusually high, banks choose discretionary income-reducing accruals.
Thus, under the income-smoothing behavior, banks choose accruals to minimize the variance of reported earnings. This implies that loan loss provisions increase during an expansionary phase and decrease during a recession phase. Consequently, the income smoothing behavior may have a positive impact on bank lending.
1 Accounting practices distinguish speci…c provisions and general provisions (Cortavaria et al., 2000) . Speci…c provisions are de…ned by speci…c accounting rules. They depend on identi…ed credit losses and they will increase speci…c loan loss reserves which are deducted from assets. General provisions have to cope with expected losses and will be added to general loan loss reserves on liabilities, but banks do not implement rigorous and statistical methods to compute them. Consequently, general provisions depend partially on expansion of total loans and they are manipulated by discretionary behaviors of bank managers.
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The two other discretionary actions are concerned with capital management and signalling. With regard to capital management, capital-constrained banks can use discretionary accruals to achieve regulatory-capital targets. General and speci…c provisions reduce Tier 1 capital via their e¤ect on earnings. But since general provisions are also included as components of Tier 2 capital and deduced from risk-weighted assets 2 , an increase in general provisions may actually increase the regulatory capital, especially if the increase in Tier 2 is larger than the decrease in Tier 1 capital. To the extent that such discretionary behavior increases regulatory capital without a corresponding reduction in risk of insolvency, it constitutes regulatory capital arbitrage. The last discretionary behavior occurs when banks use loan loss provisions to signal …nancial strength. The opportunity for signaling through discretionary loan loss provisions arises when managers have information indicating that bank values are higher than those assessed by the market. Such banks may be willing to see their market values revised upwards. One may view this is a signal that the bank is strong enough to absorb future potential losses by increasing current loan loss provisions.
The objective of this paper is to analyze the e¤ect of the provisioning system on ‡uctuations in bank lending in Europe. In particular, we attempt to determine if loan loss provisions amplify the credit cycle.
Using a panel of European banks for the period 1992-2004, we estimate the non discretionary and discretionary components of loan loss provisions in order to isolate individually their impact on banks lending. The concern about the impact of loan loss provisions on credit cycle is particularly relevant for the debate between …nancial supervisors and accounting authorities about the reform in bank provisioning systems. The current provisioning system in Europe is backward-looking (excluding Spain and Portugal since recent years) and a such system may amplify the cyclicality of bank lending. In recent years, there have been calls (Trichet, 2000; Poveda, 2000; Crockett, 2000 and Borio et al., 2001 ) for more forward-looking provisioning decisions to mitigate the potential problem that may arise from the cyclicality of lending and bank pro…tability. But there is no consensus about the way in which this should be achieved: dynamic provisioning 3 promotes banking 2 General provisions can increase loan loss reserves of up to 1.25% of risk weighted assets, the excess will be deducted from Tier1.
3 With a statistical or dynamic provisioning system, general and speci…c provisions are created continuously in the traditional manner. General provisions are established as usual to cover expected losses as a given proportion of the total loan portfolio, which are, however, not connected with direct assets and are for unspeci…ed losses. Speci…c provisions are created to cover the expected impairment of assets based on problem loans. In addition to these provisions, the statistical provision is formed with purpose of anticipating risks arising from changes in business cycles for each risk category. The statistical provision records the expected losses connected with the initial portfolio in a way that total provisions (speci…c, general and statistical) created over the years are smoothed. The statistical provision increases in periods of economic growth, complementing net speci…c provisions, which are rather low in these periods compared to total loans. Such a system was established in Spain, Portugal and Australia. 5 stability whereas Full Fair Value Accounting 4 (FFVA) promotes market discipline.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on bank behavior and procyclicality. Section 3 reports the empirical methodology employed to di¤erentiate the discretionary and non discretionary components of loan loss provisions. Section 4 presents estimates of the impact of provisioning practices on credit ‡uctuations. Section 5 discusses the credit cycle and dynamic provisioning practices. Concluding remarks are presented in the …nal section.
2 Related literature on bank behavior and procyclicality
The literature which analyzes ‡uctuations in bank lending behavior provides some empirical evidence of cyclicality. Asea and Blomberg (1998) , using US data from 1977 to 1993, show that bank lending evolves cyclically, a¤ecting aggregate economic activity. In addition, Peek et al. (2003) and Lown and Morgan (2006) clearly identify the e¤ects of loan supply on ‡uctuations in credit and GDP which supports the existence of the bank lending channel.
These interactions between the credit cycle and the business cycle are underlined on Figure 1 for Germany, France, Italy and United Kingdom over the period 1980-2004 5 . As Figure 1 shows, the growth of bank lending in these four European countries is characterized by signi…cant short term ‡uctuations. These ‡uctuations are stronger than the ones of the business cycles. Means on absolute values and standard errors (Table 1) sum up this di¤erence in size exhibited in Figure 1 . Nevertheless, the credit and business cycles have a strong and similar persistence since their …rst order autocorrelations are around 0.90 (Table 1) . Moreover, there is signi…cant interdependence between the credit and business cycles. Granger causality tests (Table 1) show that there is a feedback e¤ect between credit and GDP although this e¤ect appears weaker in Germany.
Contemporaneous correlations are also signi…cantly positive except for Italy (Table 1) . Fluctuations in bank
For a more detailed discussion on this issue, see Fernandez de Lis et al. (2001) , Borio et al. (2001) and Mann and Michael (2002) . 4 Full fair value accounting tries to approximate as closely as possible the value that the asset would have if it were traded on the market. This implies that the value of a bank's problem assets will fall immediately, in contrast with historical accounting where banks have to make reserves for the di¤erence between the book value and the actual value. One of the bene…ts of fair value accounting is that it o¤ers better information to investors and supervisors. However, the frequent changes in the value of assets exposed to market price ‡uctuations tend to amplify capital volatility and thus lending cycles. See Jackson and Lodge (2000) and the Joint Working Group Standard Setters (2000) for an overview of the debate on fair value accounting. 5 The …gures for all the European country are not reported to economize on space. We …nd that the growth of bank lending is cyclical for all them.
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halshs-00115622, version 1 -22 Nov 2006 credit thus may have signi…cant, indeed critical, e¤ects on the macroeconomic activity and may amplify swings in the economy. Bikker (2004) , for a panel of 26 OECD countries over the period 1979-1999, …nds that lending at a macroeconomic level is strongly dependent on demand factors, measured by cyclical variables such as real GDP growth, in ‡ation, unemployment and real money supply. However, such macroeconomic approach understates the role played by bank characteristics. This is because of the identi…cation problem; it is di¢ cult to separate the role of loan demand from that of loan supply. This di¢ culty has prompted researchers to focus on microeconomic panel data to explore some of the cross-sectional implications of the bank lending view.
Much concern focused on the impact of monetary policy. The responses of banks to changes in monetary policy may di¤er, depending on their characteristics. The idea behind this is that some types of banks are more capable than others to o¤set a monetary policy shock. Indeed, changes in the money market rate a¤ect the cost of funding but this has a limited e¤ect on lending when banks can easily raise non-deposit funding or when banks own a bu¤er of liquid assets. Kashyap and Stein (1995) originally proposed a reduced form dynamic equation for bank loans using a panel of American banks over the period [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] . Their …ndings are consistent with the bank lending channel view and show that loan growth of large banks and small banks respond di¤erently to a monetary policy shock. Other studies on American banks, following the approach of Kashyap and Stein (1995) , …nd that the impact of the bank lending channel is also greater for banks with less liquid assets and less capital (Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Kishan and Opiela, 2000) . The bank lending view is relevant for European banks as well (Altunbas et al., 2002; Ehrmann et al 2003) even if studies on the role of banks capital display mixed results. Individual country estimates can give more conclusive results (see Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) and Gambacorta (2005) for the Italian case).
The studies mentioned above point out a bank lending channel based on imperfections in the market for bank debt. Imperfections in the market for bank equity are also stressed to explain the impact of bank capital on lending and then to de…ne a bank capital channel (Van den Heuvel, 2002) . The bank capital channel assumes a maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities. An increase in the money market rate are therefore supposed to a¤ect more strongly interest rates on bank's liabilities than interest rates on bank's assets. Consequently, the increase in the money market rate implies a reduction in a bank pro…t and therefore 7 in the bank's capital. Since issuing equity is costly and banks have to meet capital requirements, a monetary policy shock can a¤ect bank lending. Van den Heuvel (2002) shows that the bank capital channel concerns all low-capitalized banks and not only banks with capital binding constraint. Theoretical investigations (Chami and Cosimano, 2001; Zicchino, 2005; Fur…ne, 2001 ) also emphasized the role of macroeconomic conditions and changes in banking regulation to explain the impact of capital requirement on bank lending.
The bank capital channel is consistent with empirical …ndings related to the 1990-1992 "credit crunch" in the United States. These studies focus directly on the impact of capital requirement on bank lending and try to assess whether there was a "capital crunch" caused by increased capital requirements or if more stringent regulatory practices occurred at the beginning of the 1990's 6 . Bernanke and Lown (1991) …nd a positive correlation between loan growth and changes in bank capital during 1990-1991 while Hancock and Wilcox (1998) and Peek and Rosengren (1995) detect a positive e¤ect of bank capital requirement on credit growth during the same period. Brinkmann and Horwitz (1995) also …nd a positive e¤ect on loan growth, but only for large banks. Wagster (1999) shows that stricter supervision, which occurred during the period 1990-92 in Canada, UK and the USA, implies that less credits were extended to lower-risk investments such as government bonds.
Misevaluation of credit risk over the business cycle represents another feature which may explain ‡uctu-ations in bank lending. In phases of economic boom, banks are inclined to take on greater risks, owing to their basically positive anticipations as regards the course of the economy and future trends. By contrast, banks are excessively pessimistic during cyclical downturns if they overstate credit risk. Disaster myopia Herring, 1984, 1986) , herd behavior (Rajan, 1994) and the institutional memory hypothesis (Berger and Udell, 2003) account for misevaluation of credit risk. Disaster myopia emphasizes that banks tend over time to underestimate the probability of low-frequency shocks while herd behavior focuses on the idea that banks management is obsessed with short-term concerns and perception of reputation. As for the institutional memory hypothesis, it stresses that current loan o¢ cers ease credit standards over time as the previous loan bust is not remembered because of loan o¢ cer turnover.
Backward-looking provisioning systems also contribute to the misevaluation of credit risk. Whalen (1994) 3 Estimation of the discretionary and non discretionary compo-
nents of loan loss provisions
To test the impact of loan loss provisions (LLP) on ‡uctuations in bank lending, we need to estimate the discretionary and the non discretionary components of LLP. We use a methodology similar to the one developed by Ahmed et al. (1999) .
Data and descriptive statistics
We use a sample consisting of an unbalanced panel of annual report data from 1992 to 2004 for a set of European banks in 15 European countries 7 : Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom (see Appendix, Table A1 ). The bank data used for the estimates come from Bankscope Fitch IBCA 8 . A majority of banks do not give information on some variables needed by this study (especially non performing loans and total capital ratio). Also we delete banks with less than …ve years of time series observations. Moreover, we exclude all the outliers by eliminating the extreme bank/year observations (2.5% lowest values and 2.5% highest values)
for each considered variable 9 . The …nal sample consists of 186 European banks out of the 2 513 available at the beginning (see Table A1 in the appendix for details). However, our unbalanced sample represents a signi…cant part of total loans available in Bankscope Fitch IBCA. The average cover rates of total loans are around 37% in 1992 and 54% in 2004 (see Appendix, Table A1 ).
Descriptive statistics of our sample are presented in Table 1 . Deposits are the main resource (65.67%) and loans are the main banks'assets (58.53%). These assets seem carefully managed as mean ratios of LLP to total assets and nonperforming loans to gross loans are respectively 0.41% and 5.08%. Furthermore, the total capital ratio is 12.43%. Thus, on average, banks are well capitalized with su¢ cient capital bu¤ers. 7 The European banking system can be considered as uni…ed since the Second European Banking Directive of 1989. Thus, we consider a sample of European banks without taking into account countries of origination.
8 All the banks in our sample publish their annual …nancial statements at the end of the calendar year. 9 The outliers represent around 5% of the banks excluded of our sample (approximately 125 banks). Thus most of the banks were thrown out because we miss data about some variables.
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Modelling bank provisions
Empirical evidence and economic theory (Beaver and Engel, 1996; Liu et al., 1997; Ahmed et al., 1999; Lobo and Yang, 2001 ) suggest a number of factors which may explain the choice of LLP. These may be grouped into three classes.
Non discretionary behaviors
The non discretionary component of LLP re ‡ects expected losses but backward-looking rules based on identi…ed credit loses give a strong cyclicality to this component. The model includes three variables which represent the risk of a bank's portfolio. The ratio of non performing loans to gross loans at the end of the
of the risk of default on banks'loans. Hence, we expect a positive relationship between these two variables and LLP. We also include the risk of default for the overall credit portfolio, measured by the ratio of loans to total asset (L it ). The coe¢ cient associated with this variable should also be positive.
Discretionary behaviors
The discretionary component of LLP results from three di¤erent management objectives.
The income smoothing behavior:
Under the income smoothing hypothesis, banks understate (overstate) LLP when earnings are expected to be low (high) relative to that of other years (inter-temporal smoothing). If banks use LLP to smooth earnings, then we would expect a positive relation between earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions (ER it ) and LLP. As the propensity to smooth income is higher for banks with good performance relative to banks with moderate current performance, we introduce a dummy variable which takes the value of ER it for banks with positive earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions and 0 otherwise (ER_H it ). We should …nd a positive coe¢ cient for ER_H it if there is non linearity in the relation between LLP and earnings.
The capital management behavior:
Poorly capitalized banks can use LLP to manage regulatory capital. We compute the variable T CRL it which takes the value of the total capital ratio (TCR) minus 8 and divided by 8 when observations for 11 bank i are in the …rst quartile of TCR and 0 otherwise. A positive correlation between LLP and T CRL it could be expected if poorly capitalized banks are less willing to make LLP (Shrieves and Dahl, 2002) .
However, accounting relations could also in ‡uence the relation between bank capital and loan loss provisions.
Regulatory capital is composed of Tier 1 -which includes equity and retained earnings -and Tier 2 -which includes subordinated debt and loan loss allowances (depending on general provisions). LLP are therefore positively correlated to Tier 2 and negatively to Tier 1. If regulatory capital variations are more related to retained earnings than loan loss allowances, correlation should be negative between LLP and T CRL it 10 .
The signalling behavior:
Banks can use LLP to signal …nancial strength. The variable SIGN it , de…ned as the one-year-ahead changes of earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions (
TA is the total asset), is computed to test the signalling hypothesis. A positive correlation with LLP is expected (Beaver et al., 1989; Whalen, 1994; Ahmed et al., 1999) .
Macroeconomic in ‡uences on asset quality
The macroeconomic environment should a¤ect the ability of borrowers to repay banks'assets. The private sector wealth will vary with the economic cycle, so we introduce the annual growth rate of GDP, _ y it . Some studies have empirically studied the economic cycle as a determinant of loan loss provisions (see Pain (2003) for UK banks, Fernandez de Lis et al. (2001) for the Spanish case, Cavallo and Majnoni (2001), Laeven and Majnoni (2003) and Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) ). They …nd a signi…cant and negative impact on provisions: loan losses increase (and hence LLP) when _ y it decreases. Thus, we expected a negative sign for the variable _ y it .
Model speci…cation
Equation (1) models the relationship between loan loss provisions and the explanatory variables de…ned above:
where LLP it is the ratio of loan loss provisions (speci…c provisions plus general provisions) to total assets at the end of the year t for bank i. We introduce the lagged dependent variable as explanatory variable to take into account a dynamic adjustment of LLP it . If banks adjust their provisions slowly to recognize potential losses against loans following a default event, then provisions could be systematically related each period.
The model accounts for the possibility that the use of discretionary LLP for one purpose is conditional on the e¤ects of the other two motivations; this is done by jointly estimating the relationships between loan loss provisions and income smoothing, capital management and signalling behaviors.
The estimation of equation (1) is used to compute the non discretionary component (N DISC it ) and the discretionary component (DISC it ) of the LLP. We assume that these two components are linear functions of the variables included in equation (1). Thus, the non discretionary component of LLP is estimated as the sum of the products of its explanatory variable times the corresponding estimated coe¢ cient from equation
(1). The same method is used to compute the discretionary component.
Empirical results
As we consider a dynamic adjustment of LLP, the estimation of equation (1) is performed with the generalized method of moments (GMM) using …rst di¤erences (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and orthogonal deviations (Arellano and Bover, 1995) . The results are reported in Table 2 . This estimation is robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. We also ensure that the correlations between exogenous variables are weak.
The coe¢ cients on N P L it ( 2 ) and on t=t+1 N P L it ( 3 ) are signi…cantly positive at the 1% level. This result implies that the cyclical evolution of non performing loans in ‡uences provisioning via the backward-looking rules. Bank pro…ts are therefore also in ‡uenced by the cyclicality of identi…ed credit losses via loan loss provisions. The other variable introduced to assess the e¤ect of expected credit losses on LLP choices, the ratio of loans to total asset L it , is not signi…cant at the 10% level (the t-stat is 1.30). The signi…cant and negative coe¢ cient for GDP growth ( 5 ) indicates that the macroeconomic situation is relevant which strengthen the cyclical behavior of LLP. Business cycle in ‡uences …nancial strength of …rms and households and therefore has a close relationship with problem loans. This implies not only an increase in speci…c provisions according to backward-looking rules but also an increase in the general provisions as the GDP growth modi…es the credit exposure of banks.
Concerning the discretionary behaviors, our results show that poorly capitalized banks use LLP to manage regulatory capital. Poorly capitalized banks' provisions vary directly with their surplus regulatory capital ( 8 >0). Thus, banks with low capital are less inclined in making LLP since it reduces Tier 1 via its impact on earnings. The estimated coe¢ cient of the variable earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions ( 6 ) is signi…cant and negative. This is not consistent with the hypothesis of an income smoothing behavior. On the contrary, banks reduce loan loss provisions when earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions increase.
This result emphasizes the cyclicality in loan loss provisions already underscored by the non discretionary component since high earnings are recorded during economic upswings. However, there is non linearity in the relation between LLP and earnings. The variable ER_H it , accounting for banks with a relatively good performance, exhibits a positive and signi…cant coe¢ cient ( 7 ). Wald tests shows that the total impact ( 6 + 7 ) of earnings on loan loss provisions is negative and signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 5% level for banks with a relatively good performance. Therefore, these banks are more able to o¤set the cyclicality of loan loss provisions. With regard to the signalling behavior, banks may use discretionary LLP to signal …nancial strength when the stock market underestimates their earnings. We …nd that the coe¢ cient on SIGN it ( 9 ) is positive and signi…cant, which is consistent with the signalling hypothesis.
We use the estimates of equation (1) pute di¤erent non discretionary and discretionary variables. The following three non discretionary variables are computed for each of two methods of estimation (Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) )
The variable N DISC1 it includes all the variables which may explain NDISC whereas N DISC2 it only includes the signi…cant variables at the 10% level, which implies that the variable L it is excluded. The third non discretionary variable (N DISC3 it ) excludes the lagged dependent variable LLP it 1 and the variable L it which is not signi…cant at the 10% level. On the same way, two discretionary components are computed
We consider the set of explanatory variables that are signi…cant to compute the …rst discretionary variable, DISC1 it . For the second one, we only keep the variables that may have a countercyclical e¤ect: ER_H it and SIGN it . The income smoothing and signalling behaviors may o¤set the evolution of non discretionary provisions, increasing loan loss reserves in good times. This could positively a¤ect banks'ability to supply credits, whereas the capital management may have no clear impact on the cyclicality of bank lending.
These discretionary and non discretionary variables are used to test the impact of provisioning behaviors on bank loans ‡uctuations. 
where t 1=t L it = (L it L it 1 )=0:5(T A it + T A it 1 ); T A it is the total asset; t 1=t D it is the growth rate of deposits between year (t 1) and t; _ y it is the GDP growth rate between the year (t 1) and t; i it is the money market rate; it is the in ‡ation rate; T CRL it equals (total capital ratio-8)/8 when observations for bank i are in the …rst quartile of the total capital ratio (TCR) and 0 otherwise; N DISC it equals to N DISC1 it , N DISC2 it or N DISC3 it ; DISC it equals to DISC1 it or DISC2 it ; N DISC it Dum equals to the non discretionary variable (N DISC1 it , N DISC2 it or N DISC3 it ) multiplied by a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the bank i is classi…ed as poorly capitalized (T CRL it ) and 0 otherwise.
Three groups of variables are considered in the model. Firstly, three macroeconomic variables are introduced. By including in ‡ation and GDP growth rate, the model accounts for the economic environment. We should …nd a positive sign for the GDP growth rate ( 3 >0) since this variable is related to loan demand.
The annual in ‡ation rate should have a negative sign ( 5 <0). The sign of the coe¢ cient associated with the money market rate should be negative ( 4 <0) according to the e¤ect of a contractionary monetary policy on bank lending.
Secondly, we consider bank speci…c variables. We expect a positive relationship between bank loans 16 halshs-00115622, version 1 -22 Nov 2006 ‡uctuations and the growth rate of deposits between year (t 1) and t ( 2 >0). Furthermore, one variable is computed to take into account the bank capital channel, T CRL it . We should …nd a positive sign for the coe¢ cient associated to T CRL it ( 6 >0) since the regulatory capital requirement should represent a constraint for poorly capitalized banks.
Finally, three variables are introduced to analyze the relationship between loan loss provisions and credit supply ‡uctuations. First, the non discretionary component of LLP (N DISC it ) takes up reserves that the bank have to charge to o¤set its problem loans. This component of loan loss provisions is therefore expected to reduce bank's incentive to expand its credit supply ( 7 <0) as it directly a¤ects pro…ts. During a downturn, the overall return on lending is particularly a¤ected by the upsurge in loan loss provision resulting from backward looking rules. We expect a negative coe¢ cient whatever the non discretionary variable considered:
Second, we introduce an interaction variable N DISC it Dum (Dum is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the bank i is classi…ed as poorly capitalized) to test if there is non-linearity in the relation between non discretionary provisions and credit ‡uctuations. Indeed the e¤ect of non discretionary provisions on credit ‡uctuations could be stronger for poorly capitalized banks ( 8 <0) since these banks cannot use a capital bu¤er to face an upsurge in loan losses. Third, we consider two discretionary variables: DISC1 it or DISC2 it . The second one takes only into account discretionary behaviors that may have a counterbalancing e¤ect on the cyclical evolution of non discretionary provisions and could therefore be considered as a kind of unregulated dynamic provisioning (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005) : the income smoothing and the signalling. These discretionary behaviors reduce the volatility of bank pro…ts, increasing provisions during the expansionary phase and decreasing provisions during the recession phase. As a result, pro…ts as well as provisions are smoothed, which should positively a¤ect banks ability to supply credits. We therefore expect a positive relationship between the discretionary variable DISC2 it and credit ‡uctuations in equation (7) 
Results
The estimation of equation (7) is performed with the generalized method of moments (GMM). This method is relevant because the provisioning constraints (variables N DISC it and DISC it ) are built using the coe¢ cients from the regression of equation (1) and therefore contains measurement error. In addition, the lag of the endogenous variable can lead to a simultaneity bias. These variables are therefore instrumented. Tables   2 and 3 report estimates obtained using respectively the GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and by Arellano and Bover (1995) . As we have three di¤erent non discretionary variables (N DISC1 it , N DISC2 it and N DISC3 it ) and two di¤erent discretionary variables (DISC1 it and DISC2 it ), Tables 2 and   3 display results for six estimations.
As expected, macroeconomic variables are relevant in credit ‡uctuations in all estimates. The coe¢ cient of the GDP growth rate ( 3 ) is signi…cant and positive whereas the coe¢ cient of the in ‡ation rate ( 5 ) is negative and signi…cant. The coe¢ cient of the money market interest rate ( 4 ) is signi…cant and negative.
It means that monetary policy a¤ects bank lending. We also …nd that banks use deposits to expand credit as the coe¢ cient 2 is positive and signi…cant.
With regard to the institutional constraints, we …nd that the coe¢ cient associated with the regulatory capital requirement for poorly capitalized banks ( 6 ) is positive and signi…cant at the 1% level, which is consistent with the bank capital channel. These banks are therefore constrained in their lending activities.
The provisioning rules also appear relevant in all estimates. Non discretionary loan loss provisions ( 7 ) a¤ect credit ‡uctuations negatively and signi…cantly at the 1% level. Backward-looking provisioning rules therefore amplify credit cycle: weak speci…c provisions during upswing phases encourage banks to expand credit whereas the sudden identi…cation of problem loans during downturns constrains banks to make provisions, which reduces their incentive to supply new credits. As expected, poorly capitalized banks appear more constrained by the provisioning system. Indeed, the coe¢ cient associated by the interacting term N DISC it Dum is negative and signi…cant, except two estimates in Table 4 . Jordan et al. (2002) emphasize that the cyclicality of loan loss provisions is re ‡ected in bank capital. Indeed, bank capital can also be used to face expected credit losses following a sudden quality deterioration of the loan portfolio. Capital requirements force poorly capitalized banks to shrink further lending.
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On the contrary, discretionary provisions associated with the income smoothing and signalling behaviors and acting like dynamic provisions (DISC2 it ), do not a¤ect credit ‡uctuations at the 10% level in most estimates. Likewise, we do not …nd a robust relation between the discretionary variable DISC1 it and credit ‡uctuations. Thus, discretionary accounting practices do not seem to perform as an unregulated dynamic provision system which could e¢ ciently counterbalance cyclical behavior of non discretionary provisions. The …ndings of our research are thus consistent with the call for the implementation of a dynamic provisioning in
Europe to eliminate the e¤ect of backward-looking provisioning practices on credit ‡uctuations.
Credit cycle and dynamic provisioning
The model estimated in this paper concerns bank lending ‡uctuations. Long term and short term factors cannot be properly isolated (as in Figure 1 ) since panel data with a short time period are used. However, the accounting constraint -linked to the evolution of non discretionary provisions -is relevant for short term ‡uctuations. This factor is driven by the cyclicality of identi…ed credit losses as long as banks and regulators will not implement a proper recognition of expected credit losses. Several other banks'behaviors -for example, bias toward optimism, herd behavior or disaster myopia -are more frequently highlighted to explain the credit cycle. The supervision of these behaviors is di¢ cult to implement and the importance of such behaviors tends to increase. The competition in the banking sector is strong and regulators promote internal risk management approaches, which is notably favourable for herd behavior and disaster myopia.
Conversely, the implementation of a forward-looking provisioning system could more easily reduce the credit cycle since bank regulators can adopt this system unilaterally.
A forward-looking provisioning system could break or more precisely o¤set the correlation between non discretionary provisions and credit ‡uctuations. This system consists of implementing statistical provisions linking loan loss provisions with long term expected losses and not with contemporaneous problem loans.
Statistical provisions are computed as the di¤erence between expected losses and speci…c provisions, i.e. they can either be positive or negative. Banks therefore have to estimate precisely their expected losses using their own internal models or a standard approach developed by the regulator (Fernandez de Lis speci…c provisions are weak compared to total loans -and draw down these "reserves" during downturns.
For the full business cycle, loan loss provisions are therefore smoothed.
Previous researches (Fernandez de Lis et al, 2001; Borio et al., 2001; Mann and Michael, 2002; Jiménez and Saurina, 2005) emphasize the e¤ect of dynamic provisioning to smooth bank income and to stabilize bank capital. The improvement in the evaluations of both credit risks and bank pro…ts explain these positive outcomes. Furthermore, our …ndings show that provisioning also in ‡uences credit ‡uctuations. Our estimations can be used to graphically illustrate the relevance of backward-looking provisioning practices to amplify credit ‡uctuations. Figure 2 illustrates the contributions of deposits, non discretionary provisions and GDP to changes in credit ‡uctuations. We represent the average situation which means that Figure Accounting (FFVA) suggests that all …nancial instruments -including loans -should be measured at market value. As a result, gains and losses should be recognized in the pro…t and loss account as soon as they are expected. A dynamic provisioning system represents the main alternative to take into account more cautiously expected losses. Given the cyclicality of bank lending, our result support a dynamic provisioning system as it provides a more satisfactory institutional arrangement. Indeed, FFVA is not appropriate to support …nancial stability. It can enhance the procyclical character of bank lending because immediate recognition of unrealized value might reinforce the e¤ects of shocks (Enria, 2004) . It also increases banks'earnings and regulatory capital volatilities (Barth et al., 1995) which can impact the volatility of banks' balance sheets.
Moreover, FFVA could a¤ect the liquidity transformation role of banks and could reduce their contribution to inter-temporal smoothing (Freixas and Tsomocos, 2004) . Furthermore, FFVA does not adequately recognize the speci…c nature of bank lending. It views banks as portfolio managers rather than as institutions that solve informational problems 12 . As a result, the banking industry and banking supervisor are opposed to FFVA (Chisnall, 2000) .
Conclusion
The purpose of this research was to determine if the current provisioning system in Europe ampli…es credit ‡uctuations. Using a panel of 186 European banks for the period 1992-2004, we empirically investigated the e¤ect of LLP on bank lending ‡uctuations. In the …rst step, we analyzed whether the choice of LLP re ‡ects identi…ed credit losses (non discretionary LLP) and/or management objectives (discretionary LLP). Then, in the second step, we examined the variables which have an e¤ect on bank credit ‡uctuations.
Our results show that macroeconomic variables are relevant to explain credit ‡uctuations. We also …nd that poorly capitalized banks are constrained in their lending activities. With regards to the provisioning rules, the results show that the non discretionary component of LLP ampli…es the credit cycle. During an upswing, banks tend to underestimated expected credit risk and then reduce non discretionnary LLP. Banks' incentives to grant new loans are therefore reinforced since lending costs are understated. Conversely, sudden identi…cation of problem loans during a downturn constrains banks to make non discretionary provisions, which reduces their incentive to supply new credits. In addition, this e¤ect is stronger for poorly capitalized banks since these banks cannot use a capital bu¤er to face an upsurge in loan losses. On the contrary, the discretionary component of LLP does not a¤ect credit ‡uctuations.
Our …ndings are consistent with the call for the implementation of a forward-looking principle in Europe through a dynamic provisioning system as in Spain and Portugal. Such dynamic provisioning system will require a recalibration of the Basel Accord. A fourth pillar -perhaps to be called the accounting pillarcould therefore be included in the Basel Accord especially to cope with expected credit losses. Moreover, the bank regulatory capital which incorporates general provisions up to a ceiling would also need to be changed in order to solely cover unexpected losses. Note: a, b and c indicate signi…cance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity following White's methodology.
Variable de…nitions: LLP it : ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets at the end of the year t; N P L it : ratio of non performing loans to gross loans at the end of the year t; t=t+1 N P L it : N P L growth rate between year t and (t+1); L it : ratio of loans to total assets at the end of the year t; _ y it : GDP growth rate between the year (t-1) and t; ER it : ratio of earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions to total asset; ER_H it : take the value of ER it for banks with positive earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions and 0 otherwise; T CRL it : (T CR it -8)/8 when observations for bank i are in the …rst quartile of the total capital ratio (T CR) and 0 otherwise; SIGN it : take the value of the one-year-ahead change of ER it .
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Variable de…nitions: t 1=t L it : loans' variation of bank i between years (t-1) and t / 0.5*(total assets of year (t-1) + total assets of year t); t 1=t D it : growth rate of deposits between year (t-1) and t; _ y it : GDP growth rate between the year (t-1) and t; i it : money market rate; it : in ‡ation rate; T CRL it : (T CR it -8)/8 when observations for bank i are in the …rst quartile of the total capital ratio (T CR) and 0 otherwise; N DISC1 it , N DISC2 it and N DISC3 it : the three speci…cations of the non discretionary component of LLP ; N DISC it *DumT CRL it : the non discretionary component of LLP when observations for bank i are in the …rst quartile of the total capital ratio (T CR) and 0 otherwise; DISC1 it and DISC2 it : the two speci…cations of the discretionary component of LLP .
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ROA: return on asset.
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